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Abstract
In this paper we wish to extend the empirical content of the "credit-cost channel" of
monetary policy that we proposed in Passamani and Tamborini (2005). In the first
place, we replicate the econometric estimation of the model for Italy, to which we
add Germany. We find confirmation that, in both countries, firms' reliance on bank
loans (“credit channel”) makes aggregate  supply  sensitive to  bank  interest  rates
(“cost channel”), which are in turn driven by the inter-bank rate controlled by the
central bank plus a credit risk premium charged by banks on firms. The second
extension consists of a formal econometric analysis of the idea that the interest
rate is an instrument of control for the central bank. The empirical results of the
CCC model that, according to  Johansen  and  Juselius (2003),  innovations  in the
inter-bank rate qualify this variables as a "control variable" in the system. Hence
we  replicate  the  Johansen  and  Juselius  technique  of  simulation  of  rule-based
stabilization policy. This is done for both Italy and Germany, on the basis of the
respective estimated CCC models, taking the inter-bak rate as the instrument and
the inflation of 2% as the target. As a result, we find confirmation that inflation-
targeting by way of inter-bank rate control, grafted onto the estimated CCC model,
would stabilize inflation through structural shifts of the "AS curve", that is, the
path of realizations in the output-inflation space.
Keywords:  Macroeconomics  and  monetary  economics,  Monetary  transmission
mechanisms, Structural cointegration models, Italian economy, German economy
JEL codes: E51, C32
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MONETARY POLICY THROUGH THE “CREDIT-COST CHANNEL”.
ITALY AND GERMANY
1. Introduction
The analysis of the channels through which monetary policy operates
affecting real macroeconomic fluctuations has long been and is still matter
of  research  in  the  economic  literature.  More  recent  lines  of  inquiry  have
moved in two directions. One is the "credit channel", which  refers  to  the
means by which monetary policy affects aggregate demand via banks and
credit  institutions  (Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1990),  Gertler  and  Gilchrist
(1993, 1994), Trautwein (2000)). The other direction is the "cost channel",
which  investigates  monetary  effects  on  aggregate  supply  via  firms'
production  costs,  including  the  financial  costs  (Barth  and  Ramey  (2001),
Ravenna and Walsh (2003)).
In Passamani and Tamborini (2005) (PT henceforth), we proposed to
blend these two channels into a single one, the "credit-cost channel" (CCC).
The CCC may provide a consistent framework for monetary policy analysis
for three main reasons. In the first place, the credit-channel literature offers
an explanation for the interest rate to be treated as a production extra cost:
due  to  capital  market  imperfections  (mostly  asymmetric  information
between  lenders  and  borrowers)  firms  are  forced  to  resort  to  external
sources and pay a premium on them. Secondly, it also explains why credit
represents the single source of external funds for some classes of firms and
hence  plays  a  "special  role"  in  the  production  process.  Finally,  the
transmission from policy rates to bank rates is tight and well documented,
whereas  the  transmission  to  open-market  long-term  rates  is  notoriously
problematic.
Our CCC model consists of three competitive markets - labour, credit,
and output - and three classes of agents - households, firms and banks -
with a central bank. Firms are bank-dependent for working capital and face
a real unit cost of production given by the current real wage rate plus the
(expected)  real interest rate. Monetary  policy  affects  economic  activity  as
policy-induced changes in the bank interest rate exert a credit-cost effect on2
firms that shifts labour demand, output supply and demand, given rational
expectations of future inflation. A major implication of the CCC is that the
supply-side impact of monetary shocks is amplified. The joint consideration
of the credit and cost channels may overcome the weaknesses of the two
separate approaches yielding a pattern of macroeconomic relationships that
fit  and  explain  the  observed  empirical  regularities  in  major  industrial
countries  with  no  recourse  to  additional  non-competitive  hypotheses,
namely:
·  monetary policy impulses have persistent real effects
·  policy interventions are followed by delayed adjustment of prices
·  real wages are also procyclical with output after a monetary shock.
The evidence presented in PT by means of  a structural cointegration
analysis  (Johansen  (1996))  of  the  CCC  model  for  Italy  (1986:1-1998:12)
supports the view that firms' reliance on bank loans makes aggregate supply
sensitive to bank interest rates, which are in turn driven by the inter-bank
rate controlled by the central bank plus a credit risk premium charged by
banks on firms.  Moreover, the structural cointegration technique allowed to
point out that changes in the inter-bank rate trigger transitory dynamics as
maintained by current conventional wisdom, but, as a result of the supply-
side effect, transitory dynamics occurs around shifting long-run equilibrium
paths of output and inflation.
In  this  paper  we  wish  to  extend  the  empirical  content  of  the  CCC
approach. In the first place, we replicate the econometric estimation of the
model for Italy, to which we add Germany. Germany qualifies as a natural
case study for the same reasons as Italy. First, because bank credit is an
important  element  in  the  transmission  mechanism  of  monetary  policy  in
both countries. As shown in Gambacorta (2001, pp. 12-15), in both countries
the  business  sector  was  heavily  dependent  on  bank  credit  in  the  years
between 1986 and 1998, the period chosen for the analysis. In fact, in this
period,  figures  on  the  composition  of  financial  liabilities  of  Italian  firms
were  similar  to  German  ones,  with  a  relatively  low  stock  market
capitalization.  Moreover,  the  weight  of  bank  credit  with  respect  to  total
credit was 85% for Italy and 84% for Germany, the share of loans backed by
collateral and the availabilitity of non bank finance were very similar. Yet
whereas  both  countries  have  been  object  of  numerous  investigations
detecting the traditional demand effects of the credit channel (see Fiorentini3
and Tamborini (2001) for a survey), to our knowledge investigations of the
supply-side effects are very limited1.
On the other hand, Germany and Italy historically differed as far as
the conduct of pre-EMU monetary policy is concerned. The role of the credit
market in the monetary transmission mechanism has always been carefully
monitored by the Italian monetary authorities and was explicitly included in
the  Bank  of  Italy's  (BoI)  econometric  model  (1997a).  Direct  controls  over
credit  supply  were  also  explicitly  considered  among  the  BoI's  policy
instruments.  By  contrast,  the  Bundesbank  (BB)  officially  endorsed    the
money-quantity approach based in the monetarist tradition. However, the
official policy style only concealed the importance that the BB attached to
the role of credit and bank rates in the transmission mechanism. What is
more important, the time periods we have chosen for the two countries (see
below) saw a substantial homogeneization of the policy framework in the
two  countries  under  the  pressure  of  the  exchange-rate  constraints  of  the
European Monetary System (EMS) first, and of the convergence towards the
single currency later (Angeloni (1994), Visco (1995)). In the second half of
the '1980s, the BoI abandoned the pervasive and recurrent administrative
interventions  that  characterized  the  previous  decades.  In  the  1990s,  all
major  European  central  banks  moved  towards  a  more  or  less  explicit
practice of interest-rate control, the well-known "corridor of rates", that was
eventually  adopted  by  the  European  Central  Bank  (European  Monetary
Institute (1997)).
The model for Italy is re-estimated over the same time period (1986:1-
1998:12) and with a monthly data set including the same variables (the real
wage rate, the inter-bank interest rate, industrial production and inflation)
except for the proxy of credit risk, which is now given by the spread between
the bank lending rate and the medium-term government bond yield (a proxy
largely employed in the relevant literature: see Fiorentini and Tamborini
                                           
1 As regards Italy, see Fiorentini and Tamborini (2002). Gaiotti and Secchi (2004)
find evidence of a cost channel of monetary policy at industry-level data. Yet they
follow the Barth-Ramey (2001) approach, that is, industry partial equilibrium, with
no  explicit  modelling  of  the  credit  market.  Moreover,  they  assume  imperfect
competition in such a way that the cost channel is identified by a positive pass-
through of  the interest rate on prices.4
(2001))2. The model for Germany is estimated over a shorter time period
(1990:1-1998:12) in order to bypass the reunification shock, and with the
same data set as Italy. For both countries the results are consistent with the
previous findings in PT.
The  second  extension  of  our  empirical  study  consists  of  a  formal
econometric analysis of the idea that the interest rate is an instrument of
control for the central bank. The above mentioned empirical results found
by means of the Johansen technique indicate that innovations in the inter-
bank rate shift the stochastic paths of output and inflation.  According to
Johansen  and  Juselius  (2003)  this  result  qualifies  this  variables  as  a
"control  variable"  in  the  system:  a  control  variable  is  such  that  its
innovations  have  a  significant  long-run  impact  on  the  associated  target
variable of the system, and make it stationary around the desired target. In
this paper, we apply the Johansen and Juselius technique of simulation of
rule-based stabilization policy whereby the control variable is aimed to the
associated target variable. This is done for both Italy and Germany, on the
basis of the respective estimated CCC models, taking the inter-bak rate as
the instrument and the inflation target of 2% as the target. As a result, we
find confirmation that inflation-targeting by way of inter-bank rate control,
grafted  onto  the  estimated  CCC  model,  would  stabilize  inflation  through
structural shifts of the "AS curve", that is, the path of realizations in the
output-inflation space. The simulation can then be interpreted in two ways.
As  a  "counterfactual"  exercise,  it  shows  how  the  history  of  output  and
inflation would have differed in the two countries if the two central banks
had  followed  the  2%  rule  in  the  past.  As  a  "predictive"  ceteris-paribus
exercise, it shows how output and inflation react in  the  two  countries  in
response to the common policy rule of  2%.
2. The structural relations identifying the "credit-cost
channel"
In light of the relevant literature, the key features of the CCC model
are that (Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988, 1993):
·  production takes time, typically 1 time period: t, t+1
                                           
2 In PT (2005) this proxy was given by an independent estimation of the deviations
from a cointegrated relationship between output and firms' outstanding bank debt
representing their solvency condition.5
·  firms need external funds in advance to finance working capital
·  these funds come from bank credit.
The important element in the cost-channel models of monetary policy
is the labour demand function of the bank-dependent firm. When firms plan
production at any time t, they are uncertain about their future revenue from
output sales. The sale price of a firm j at time t+1 is a random draw from the
probability  distribution  with  density  f(P ~
jt+1),  cumulative  function  F,  and
expected value E(P ~
jt+1) = Pt+1 for all j.  Assuming that all firms use the
same production technology (Q(·)) and face the same current real wage rate
(wt º Wt/Pt) and nominal bank interest rate (rt), in each period t along the
otpimal production path they will employ labour (Nd
t) up to the point where
the  marginal  product  equals  the  expected  real  unit  cost,  which  is  the
compound  real  cost  of  labour  and  credit  (Greenwald  and  Stiglitz  (1988,
1993),  Christiano  and  Eichenbaum  (1992),  Christiano  et  al.  (1997)).  In
addition  to  the  usual  negative  relationship  with  the  real  wage  rate,  the
main features of labour demand/output supply due to bank debt are that: 1)
they are systematically lower than the values for the unconstrained firm for
any positive interest rate, 2) they are decreasing in the real interest rate.
As is typical of this class of models, three activities of households are
considered:  labour  supply,  output  demand  and  saving  (Christiano  et  al.
(1997)). The labour supply function (Ns
t) displays the usual properties once
account is taken of the fact that current working time is the means to buy
future consumption, so that the expected rate of inflation (pe
t+1) affects the
working time distribution over time. In an economy where there is no direct
lending to firms, the consumption demand function shows that at the end of
each  period  this  can  be  equal  to,  or  less  than,  the  real  value  of  deposits
(Dt/Pt)  and  the  result  is  a  simple  demand  function  determined  by  real
money  balances.  Yet  these  are  endogenous  with  the  amount  of  loans
extended to firms (Lt = Dt).
Banks collect deposits from households at zero rate, can borrow from
the central bank at the given official rate,  and offer standard debt contracts
to  firms  in  a  competitive  credit  market.  As  to  the  cost  of  funds,  in  the
absence of the interest rate on deposits, we introduce a kind of cost which is
important in bank's risk management and gives the central bank an explicit
role to play via the official rate. In view of the  fact  that  households  will
claim  on  their  deposits  one  period  later,  the  bank  should  secure  itself  a
sufficient amount of liquid resources. As a result, the interest rate on loans6
charged by the bank is (approximately) given by rt » rt + kt,where rt is a
measure of credit risk. Hence, rt can be interpreted as the sum of the official
rate plus a credit risk premium providing the link between monetary policy
and aggregate supply.
We  can  summarize  the  complete  macroeconomic  equilibrium  as
follows:
Labour market
(2.1)  Nd(wt, rt, pe
t+1) =  Ns(wt, pe
t+1)
Credit market
(2.2)  Lt = WtNt
(2.3)  Dt = Lt
(2.4)  rt » rt + kt
Output market
(2.5)  Q(Nd(wt, rt, pe
t+1)) = Dt /Pt+1
(2.6)  pe
t+1 = Et(P ~
jt+1/Pt - 1) = Pt+1/Pt - 1
The thrust of our model is that variations of kt (and/or rt) can, under
certain conditions, generate a pattern of relationships which is consistent
with the empirical regularities observed in major industrialized countries,
i.e. dwt/dkt < 0, dQ(t)t+s/dkt < 0,dpt+s/dkt < 0 to the exclusion of ancillary
hypotheses like monopolistic competition or price stickiness3.
The CCC transmission mechanism, to which we shall refer as the null
hypothesis, hinges on the signs of the variables kt and rt in the equations for
pt+s, wt, and qt+s , and it implies the unique pattern of signs of coefficients in
Table 1.
                                           
3 The above-mentioned conditions are, in terms of first derivatives, Ns
p < Ns
w and
QN < 1. The condition  QN < 1 is consistent with non-increasing returns in a large
class of production functions (the Cobb-Douglas function is the typical example). As
is well known, the relative magnitude of Ns
p  and Ns
w has played a major role in
the  development  of  modern  business  cycle  theory.  Theories  that,  in  order  to  fit
observable  comovements  between  real  or  nominal  impulses  and  output
(employment),  postulate  large  intertemporal  substitution  effects  (Ns
p) (as  in  the
standard  versions  of  real  business  cycle  models)  have  been  impaired  by  their
inability to detect that condition in the data. By contrast, the CCC transimission
mechanism identified by our model does yield the observable correlations  thanks to
a relatively small intertemporal substitution effect.7
Table 1. The pattern of coefficient signs for the CCC hypothesis
H0 kt rt
pt+12 b13 < 0 b14 < 0
wt b23 < 0 b24 < 0
qt+12 b33 < 0 b34 < 0
3. Identification and estimation of the structural relationships
In this section we present the results of the econometric analysis of
the CCC model presented above applied to both Italy (1986:1-1998:12) and
Germany (1990:1-1998:12). In what follows we summarize the main steps
and results.  Details on statistical procedures and tests are gathered in a
separate Statistical Appendix.
3.1.Data and methodology
According  to  the  CCC  model,  the  variables  of  interest  for  both
countries are:
·  the  real  wage  rate  wt,  measured  by  the  industrial  wage  index  at  the
producer cost;
·  the monetary policy variable kt, for which we have used the inter-bank
rate4;
·  the credit risk premium rt, not observable, for which we have adopted, as
a  proxy,  an  appropriately  defined  log  transformation  of  the  spread
between the bank lending rate and the medium-term government bond
yield for Italy5 and of the spread between the short-term bank lending
rate and the money market rate for Germany;
·  output Qt+s, given by the industrial production index;
·  the inflation rate, pt+s, measured by the consumer price index.
 Our theoretical focus is on the inter-bank rate kt. Thus, instead of
adding  the  rate  on  bank  loans  as  an  independent  variable,  we  have
considered directly its two components kt and rt. The latter variable mainly
                                           
4 Since the inter-bank rate is highly sensitive to central bank interventions, it is
taken to be the closest market indicator of monetary policy in almost all available
empirical  studies  of  the  credit  channel  in  Italy  (see  e.g.  De  Arcangelis  and  Di
Giorgio (1998).
5 The same spread has been used for Italy by Chiades and Gambacorta (2004).8
allows for control for autonomous changes in credit conditions. Hence rt, a
problematic variable to measure, is not crucial for the significance of the
model.
In consideration of the fact that  Italy, in  the  relevant  time  period,
faced  constraints  on  domestic  monetary  policy  and  interest  rates  due  to
strong exchange-rate targeting and high capital mobility in the EMS, we
have also added
·  the German inter-bank rate, k*
t.6
As to Germany, though she was generally regarded as the uncontrained
country  in  the  EMS  country,  we  have  also  added  an  exogenous  foreign
variable to control for world monetary conditions, namely
·  the three months LIBOR in US dollar, Lib.
The  time  lead  s  to  be  applied  to  Q  and  p  should  capture  the
theoretical  gestation  time  of  output  and  the  related  time-horizon  for
expected inflation7.  A time lead of 12 months has been chosen empirically
by means of sensitivity tests.
All  variables,  except  interest  rates,  are  log-transformed  and  are
observed through monthly times series, plotted with sources in Figure 1 for
Italy and in Figure 2 for Germany.
Since  our  aim  is  to  test  a  fully  specified  system  of  structural
relationships,  for  the  reasons  put  forward  in  the  Introduction  we  have
chosen the structural cointegration approach developed by Johansen (1996)
                                           
6 The literature on monetary policy in the EMS (see e.g. De Grauwe (1992)) would
predict that in a  country  like  Italy the domestic  interest  rate could  not  deviate
systematically from uncovered parity with Germany, as implied by
kt - k*t = Et(e ɺ) ® 0
where  Et(e ɺ)  is  the  expected  depreciation  rate.  However,  temporary  non-zero
interest differentials would still be possible as long as the implied expected change
in  the  exchange-rate  remained  within  the  band  of  the  parity.  On  this  view,  a
monetary  policy  shock  can  be  identified  by  a  deviation  from  uncovered  interest
parity, i.e. a non-zero interest-rate differential. Suppose k*t rises in Germany while
kt remains constant in Italy: the interest rate differential in Italy falls. Given the
commitment to the exchange-rate parity, this is perceived as a positive monetary
shock.  We consequently introduced the two inter-bank rates as two independent
variables with opposite expected sign, and we let the data say to what extent they
actually exerted independent effects. It is worth noting that the introduction of the
German  inter-bank  rate  substantially  improved  the  overall  quality  of  the
estimates.
7Since in PT we assumed flexible prices and rational expectations, we could take
the  actual  inflation  rate  on  the  same  time  lead  as  output  as  a  proxy  for  the
theoretical expected inflation.9
and Johansen and Juselius (2003), both for the estimation and identification
of  the  long-run  structural  relationships  among  the  theoretically  relevant
variables, and for the evaluation of the policy variable as a control variable
of the system8.
3.2. Econometric results
In the first place, for the p-dimensional (p = 5) observed process y't =
[pt+12,  wt,  qt+12,  kt,  rt,]  we  have  assumed  an  unrestricted  vector
autoregressive model written in error correction form (VECM). The model
has been augmented, in both countries, to include an exogenous  variable
and deterministic terms. The resulting equation is the following:
(3.1)  t t t
n
i
i t i t t t ε ΦD     Πx x Γ z Γ y + + + + + D + D = D -
-
=




where z't = [k*t], x't =[y't, z't], e e e et  is a vector of normal disturbances, D is the
first  difference  operator  and  G G G G,  P P P P,  F F F F  are  matrices  of  coefficients.    The
deterministic  terms  include  a  vector  of  constants  m m m m0,  a  linear  trend  t
restricted  in  the  analysis  to  the  cointegration  space9,  a  vector  of
intervention dummies Dt
10. The number n of lags in (3.1), n = 3 for Italy and
n = 2 for Germany, was determined on the basis of misspecification tests11.
                                           
8  The  entire  empirical  analysis  was  performed  using  the  CATS  software  which
needs the RATS package to be run. The results are available upon request.
9 Given linear trends in the data, this choice is generally the best specification with
which to begin, unless we have a strong prior hypothesis that the trends cancel in
the cointegration relations.
10  In  order  to  obtain  residuals  close  to  Normality,  in  the  Italian  data-set  we
introduced five permanent intervention dummies and two transitory intervention
dummies into our data set to account for the exit of the Italian Lira from the EMS
in  1992  and  for  few  other  events.  The  permanent  intervention  dummies  were
defined  for  1991/I,  1991/V,  1992/VII,  1994/IV  and  1995/III.  The  transitory
intervention dummies were defined for shocks of opposite signs in 1992/IX-1992/X,
and  in  1993/III-1993/IV.  In  the  German  data-set  we  introduced  two  permanent
intervention dummies for 1991/X and 1996/I.
11For the Italian data the results of specification tests for the unrestricted VAR(3)
model  with  dummies  take  the  following  values:  the  LM(1)  test  for  first  order
autocorrelation,  asymptotically  distributed  as  a 
2
25 c variable,  is  equal  to  26.186
with a p-value of 0.399; as concerns residual Normality, the test  asymptotically
distributed as a  2
10 c variable, is equal to 19.217, with a p-value of 0.038.
For the German data the results of specification tests for the unrestricted VAR(2)
model  with  dummies  take  the  following  values:  the  LM(1)  test  for  first  order
autocorrelation  is  equal  to  33.576  with  a  p-value  of  0.117;  the  test  for  residual10
Italy
We have then sought for cointegrating relations, first of all for Italy.
The procedure has followed closely the previous one in PT (2005) to which
we refer the reader for greater details. Here we summarize the main steps:
·  by standard procedure, tests indicated 3 cointegrating vectors, and hence
2 nonstationary relations12
·  the unrestricted relations have  been  normalized  with  respect  to  the  3
variables that the theory indicates as "endogenous" (pt+12, wt, qt+12) vis-à-
vis the CCC “explanatory” variables  (kt, rt, k*t) and the trend
·  identification13  (two  zero  restrictions  and  one  normalization  on  each
cointegrating relation in order to satisfy the rank and order condition)
has  been  accomplished  by  exploting  the  forward-looking  sequential
structure of the theoretical model; consequently, the unrestricted system
(2.1),  extended  to  include  the  variable  k*t  in  the  relations,  could  be
restricted to a quasi-reduced “pyramid” form simply by setting b11 = b12 =
b22 = 014.
Below  we  report  the  final  just-identified  long-run  relations  (t-
statistics  in  parentheses;  bold  coefficients  denote  significance  at  10%)
together with the value of the LR test15:
_____________________________
Normality  is  equal  to  26.824,  with  a  p-value  of  0.003.  As  concerns  residual
Normality  for  Germany,  this  is  rejected  due  to  excess  kurtosis  in  real  wages.
Because VAR estimates are more sensitive to  deviations  from  Normality  due  to
skewness than to excess kurtosis, we consider the model chosen as a well specified
one.
12 See the Statistical Appendix A1
13  As  shown  in  Chapter  10  of  Juselius’  “Notes”  for  “Advanced  Econometrics”,
www.econ.ku.dk/okokj/, the  long-run structure  can  be  identified  in  the  so  called
reduced form (3.1) of the cointegrated VAR model, so that we can test structural
hypotheses  on  the  long-run  structure  β   without  having  jointly  to  identify  the
short-run structure.
14 . In addition, in the third relation we set the coefficient of k*t equal to zero, as it
did  not  show  up  as  significant,  though  correctly  signed,  in  any  preliminary
analysis.
15  The  degreees  of  freedom  of  the  LR  test  corresponds  to  the  weak  exogeneity
restrictions for the variable kt, which support the finding that the interbank rate
can be considered as an instrument policy variable.11
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These statistical relationships identify the determinants of the long-
run equilibrium stochastic paths along which the l.h.s variables are moved,
and around which their short-run dynamics gravitate. These relationships
are  broadly  consistent  with  the  theoretical  model  and  with  those  in  PT
(2005):
·  the  inter-bank  rate  kt  always  has  the  expected  signs  and  significant
coefficients on inflation, real wage rate and output
·  correction for uncovered interest parity via the German rate k*t has also
the  expected  sign  (see  also  fn.  6)  (apart  from  the  equation  for  output
where  it  is  constrained  to  zero),  but  is  significant  only  in  the  second
relation16
·  the proxy for the credit risk premium rt also replicates the same results
in PT (2005) in spite of the change of measurement: it proves consistent
with the null hypothesis in the real wage equation and in  the  output
equation.
  As  explained  previously,  the  result  for  the  inter-bank  rate,  in
particular  that  it  has  a  negative  effect  on  the  real  wage  rate,  can  be
considered evidence that this variable operates through the supply side of
the economy in a way that cannot be consistently explained by the nominal
rigidity or the monopolistic competition hypotheses (see Table 1).
Germany
The  search  for  structural  cointegrating  relations  for  Germany  has
followed the same strategy as for Italy. Instead of the variable k*t, we have
Libt as exogenous variable. Given that Germany had no explicit non-EMS
exhange-rate target, we expect that, unlike k*t for Italy, Libt takes the same
                                           
16 It should be noted that imposing in the first relation the restriction in order to
identify  the  strict  uncovered  interest  parity,  i.e.  b13  =  -  b15,  would  have  made
significant the coefficient of k*t .12
sign as the domestic rate (see also fn. 6). The pattern of signs of coefficients
reported in Table 1 should still be valid for the endogenous variables kt and
rt . Below we report the final just-identified long-run relations (t-statistics in
parentheses; bold coefficients denote significance at 10%) together with the
value of the LR test17:
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The  inter-bank  rate  kt,and  the  risk  rt  always  have  the  expected,
significant  coefficients  on  inflation,  real  wage  rate  and  output.  The
coefficient on variable LIBOR is significant and shows the expected sign in
each relation.
4. Is the inter-bank rate a control variable in the system?
Overall, the statistical picture is one where changes in the inter-bank rate
trigger transitory dynamics, as maintained by current conventional wisdom,
but the key finding is that transitory dynamics occurs around shifting long-
run equilibrium paths of output and inflation. In other words, shifts in the
values of kt should displace the long-run "AS curve" in the output-inflation
space.
We have then performed a more rigorous statistical analysis of this
transmission  mechanism  by  drawing  on  Johansen  and  Juselius  (2003).
Their methodology hinges on three elements. First, a variable is controllable
if  it  can  be  made  stationary  around  a  desired  target  value  by  using  an
instrument variable. Secondly, a necessary condition for a variable to be an
instrument is that there be a significant long-run impact of a shock to the
instrument on the target variable. Thirdly, given controllability, a control
rule specifies interventions on the instrument conditional on the observed
                                           
17 See Statistical Appendix A113
state of the target variable relative to the target18.
To implement this procedure it has been necessary to move from the
VAR representation to the VMA representation of the process  t y  and, in
particular,  to  the  (p´p)  matrix  ^
-
^ ^ ^ = ' ) ' ( α Γβ α β C 1 ,  which  plays  an
important  role  in  understanding  the  I(1)  models.  Its  elements  convey
information about the long-run impact of cumulated shocks to the system
variables. Given the reduced rank r of matrix P P P P, the matrix C is also of a
reduced rank (p-r),  which  corresponds  to  the  number  of  driving  forces  or
common stochastic trends. In other words, the matrix C informs on how the
endogenous variables react to the nonstationary forces driving the system.
Our  aim  was  not  to  identify  these  forces,  but  to  understand  how  the
variables react to the cumulated shocks whose combinations give rise to the
non stationary driving forces. In this way, it has been possible to evaluate
the  effects  on  inflation  and  output  of  unexpected  changes  in  the  policy
action.
If we consider the inter-bank rate as the instrument, and inflation
and output as the targets, we can see from the corresponding rows of the
estimated  matrix  C ˆ ,  reported  in  Table  3  for  Italy  and  in  Table  4  for
Germany, that the target variables can in fact be controlled by the inter-
bank rate in both countries.
Table 3. Italy: the long-run impact on inflation and output of unanticipated
shocks  to  the  system  (t-values  in  parentheses,  bold  coefficients  denote
significance at 5%)
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18 See Statistical Appendix A2.14
Table  4.  Germany:  the  long-run  impact  on  inflation  and  output  of
unanticipated shocks to the system (t-values in parentheses, bold coefficients
denote significance at 5%)
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The interesting information obtained is that innovations in the inter-
bank rate have a negative, significant at 5%, long-run impact on inflation
and  on  industrial  production  in  both  countries.  Johansen  and  Juselius
detect the same result in the case of the United States, though with the
anomaly of a positive sign. They conjecture that this anomaly may be due to
lack  of  the  supply  side  in  their  model;  our  result  suggests  that  their
conjecture may be right.
It is now possible to see how a derived control rule for the instrument
variable, applied at all points in time, would make a nonstationary target
variable  become  stationary  around  a  desired  mean  value.  Following
Johansen and Juselius, we have performed a simulation analysis  of the use
of the inter-bank rate as an instrument to directly control inflation, and of
the  consequences  of  this  control  rule  on  the  other  relevant  variable,
industrial production19.
In  order  to  derive  the  control  rule,  we  have  first  assumed  that
monetary  policy  sets  the  value  of  the  controlled  instrument  (ctr)  as  a
reaction  to  the  observed  value  of  the  target  variable  with  respect  to  its
target  value.  Then  the  market  reacts,  generating  a  new  observed  value
(new). Monetary policy intervenes again on the controlled instrument and
then the market reacts again. The ordering of the observed values for the
process y is therefore the following:














t t y y y y y y y y  ,
At any time t the control rule applied by the monetary authority has





t v y y + = .
                                           
19  Hence  we  have  simulated  a  pure  inflation  targeting  regime,  rather  than  a
common Taylor rule where output is also a target.15
Given  our  estimated  VECM  model,  the  intervention  t v   is  a  complicated
matrix function that depends on (Johansen and Juselius (2003, p.10)):
·  the actual discrepancy between the observed and desired value of the
target variable;
·  the observed deviation of the process from the steady state value on
the attractor set and its short-run adjustment dynamics.




t k k -   on  the
interbank rate needed to make the inflation rate stationary around a target
mean of 2%, and  Figure 4 and 5 report, respectively, the observed and the
new inflation rate and the observed and the new output, using the derived
control rule at all time points. Our main comments are the following.
First, in Figure 3 it is apparent that had the BoI aimed at stabilizing
inflation  around  2%  throughout  the  sample  period,  the  interventions
needed, once the control process had  begun,  would  have  been very  small
indeed and would have made the interbank rate a bit higher than observed
in the early 1980s (high inflation) but a bit lower than observed in the late
1990s (low inflation).
Secondly,  Figure  4  shows  that,  as  implied  by  the  estimated
parameters of matrix C, inflation would have fallen under the control of the
inter-bank  rate,  in  the  sense  that  the  "controlled"  pattern  exhibited  by
Figure 4 would in fact have made the "new" inflation path stationary around
the 2% target. In particular note that the speed of convrgence towards the
2% target would have been faster.
Thirdly, the estimated parameters of matrix C, however, also imply
that  inflation-targeting  would  have  not  been  neutral  on  the  industrial
production stochastic path. This is in fact highlighted by Figure 5, where it
can  be  seen  that  as  long  as  the  "controlled"  inter-bank  rate  exceeds  the
actual one (1980s), industrial production is shifted onto a path lower than
the observed one. The reverse occurs when the "controlled" inter-bank rate
is lower than the actual one (1990s).
Summary evidence of the previous two findings is provided by Figure
6, which plots the scatter diagrams of observed vis-à-vis "new"  inflation and
output realizations. Controllability of inflation by means of the inter-bank
rate  is  obtained  by  structurally  shifting  the  (long-run)  "AS  curve".  As
implied by targeting the 2% inflation rate, the "new AS"  is flattened. The
lower side of the diagram reflects the loss of output incurred by aiming at
2% inflation in the 1980s. Given the 2% inflation target, and given that the16
model  embodies  rational  expectations,  the  dispersion  of  realizations  of
output and inflation around the "new AS" is only due to optimal responses
to  non-policy  random  shocks.  Taylor's  (1998)  concept  of  output-inflation
variability trade-off is then relevant and can be neatly captured by sample
standard errors. These in fact reveal that, in line with theory, pure inflation
targeting would reduce inflation variability (from the observed 0.016  to the
"new"  0.008)  but  it  would  also  raise  output  variability  (from  0.06  to  0.1,
respectively).
Figure 7, Figure 8 and Figure 9 show for Germany, respectively, the




t k k -   on  the  inter-bank  rate  needed  to  make  the
inflation rate stationary around a target mean of 2%, the observed and the
"new"  inflation  rate  and  the  observed  and  the  "new"  output,  using  the
derived  control  rule  at  all  time  points.  As  concern  Figures  7  and  8,  the
comments are very similar to the ones for Italy. Yet the disinflationary gain
of a consistent 2% rule in the early part of period is less pronounced than in
Italy (probably, the BB policy was closer to the simulated rule than that of
the BoI). By contrast, like Italy, Figure 9 shows that inflation targeting by
means of control of the inter-bank rate would have greatly reduced output
during the first years whereas it would have allowed for output gains in the
terminal part of the period. It should be recalled that we are trying to see
how the control process would have worked over a rather short time period,
the  post-reunification  years.  The  time  compression  may  thus  force  larger
swings in the convergence process.
Figure  10  shows  the  scatter  diagram  of  observed  vis-à-vis  "new"
inflation and output realizations for Germany. Again, the result is similar to
Italy, namely a clear structural shift of the long-run "AS curve" which is
"horizontalized" around the 2% inflation target.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have put forward an empirical extension of the CCC
model of monetary policy presented in a previous  work  (PT  (2005)).  This
model combines bank credit supply, as a means whereby monetary policy
affects economic activity ("credit channel"), and interest rates on loans as a
cost to firms ("cost channel"). The thrust of the model is that firms' reliance
on  bank  loans  makes  aggregate  supply  dependent  on  credit  variables,
namely  the  official  rate  controlled  by  the  central  bank  and  a  credit  risk17
premium charged by banks on firms. This yields a pattern of relationships
consistent with the set of empirical regularities that are today regarded as
the  explanandum  of  monetary  macroeconomics,  with  no  recourse  to
additional  non-competitive  hypotheses.  Moreover,  the  presumption  arises
that the CCC may also have permanent, rather than transitory, effects on
real variables.
The  emprical  extensions  of  the  model  presented  in  this  paper
consisted  of  two  parts.  First,  we  have  re-estimated  the  model  for  Italy
(1986:1 to 1998:12) with a new measure of the  credit  risk  premium,  and
estimated  it  also  for  Germany  (1990:1  to  1998:12).  The  statistical
methodology adopted has enabled us to apply a single integrated framework
to both the identification of structural relationships among the variable of
interest - i.e. the determinants of the long-run stochastic equilibrium path
of these variables - and their deviations from these paths. Statistics support
the  hypothesis  that,  in  both  countries,  by  way  of  the  CCC  transmission
mechanism, the inter-bank rate - which turns out to be a weakly exogenous
variable for the system of variables in both countries - is a co-determinant,
with negative sign, of the long-run stochastic equilibrium paths of the real
wage  rate,  output  and  inflation  around  which  transitory  dynamics  takes
place.
Second, by exploiting the properties of Johansen-Juselius's theory of
control, we have also provided a statistical test and measure that supports
the hypothesis that the inter-bank rate qualifies as a control variable for
output and inflation. By simulating a control rule of inflation, we have also
shown  that  control  is  gained  because  innovations  in  the  inter-bank  rate
exert  a  significant  long-run  impact  on  both  the  inflation  and  output
stochastic paths. Graphically, this transmission mechanism shifts the long-
run AS curve.
We believe that our main conclusions may be of general interest, at
least for countries where firms significantly  depend  on  bank  credit.  Italy
and Germany are also major economies in the euro area, where inflation-
targeting  by  means  of  inter-bank  rates  control  is  one  official  pillar  of
monetary  policy,  and  where  better  understanding  of  country-specific
transmission mechanisms is a priority for the monetary authority.   18
References
Angeloni I. 1994, "Strumenti e obiettivi operativi della Banca d'Italia: verso
un modello europeo", Note Economiche, 14, 128-161.
Banca d'Italia (1997a), "I canali di trasmissione della politica monetaria nel
modello  econometrico  trimestrale  della  Banca  d'Italia",  Temi  di
Discussione, n.316, Rome, Banca d’Italia.
Barth  M.J.,  Ramey  V.  (2001),  “The  Cost  Channel  of  Monetary
Transmission”,  in  Bernanke  B.,  Rogoff  K.  (eds.),  NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 2001, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press.
Bernanke B., Gertler M. (1995), "Inside the Black Box: the Credit Channel
of Monetary Policy Transmission", Journal of Economic Perspectives,
9, 27-48.
Chiades P., Gambacorta L. (2004). "The Bernanke and Blinder Model in an
Open Economy: the Case of Italy", The German Economic Review, 5,
pp. 1-34
Christiano L.J., Eichenbaum M. (1992), “Liquidity Effects and the Monetary
Transmission Mechanism”, American Economic Review, 80, 703-725.
Christiano  L.J,  Eichenbaum  M.,  Evans  C.L.  (1997),  “Sticky  Price  and
Limited Participation  Models  of  Money:    A  Comparison”,  European
Economic Review, 41, 1201-1249.
De  Arcangelis  G.,  Di  Giorgio  G.  (1998),  "In  Search  of  Monetary  Policy
Measures: The Case of Italy in the 1990s", Giornale degli Economisti
e Annali di Economia, 57, 213-250.
De  Grauwe  P.  (1992),  The  Economics  of  Monetary  Integration,    Oxford,
Oxford University Press.
European Monetary Institute (1997), The Single Monetary Policy in Stage
Three, Frankfurt.
Fiorentini  R.,  Tamborini  R.  (2001)  ,  "The  Monetary  Transmission
Mechanism  in  Italy:  The  Credit  Channel  and  a  Missing  Ring",
Giornale degli Economisti, 61, 1-42.
Fiorentini R., Tamborini R. (2002) "Monetary Policy, Credit and Aggregate
Supply",  Economic Notes, 31, 1-48.
Gaiotti E., Secchi A. (2004), “Are Monetary Policy Actions a Supply Shock?
An  Exploration  Using  Italian  Firm-Level  Data”,  Banca  d’Italia,
mimeo.
Gambacorta L. (2001), "Bank Specific Characteristics and Monetart Policy
Transmission", Temi di Discussione, Banca d'Italia, n.486.
Garratt A., Lee K., Pesaran M.H., Shin Y. (2003), “A Long Run Structural
Macroeconometric Model of the UK”, The Economic Journal, 113, 412-
455.
Gertler M., Gilchrist S. (1993), "The Role of Credit Market Imperfections in
the Monetary Transmission Mechanism: Arguments and  Evidence",
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 93, 43-64.19
Gertler M., Gilchrist S. (1994), "Monetary Policy, Business Cycles and the
Behaviour  of  Small  Manufactoring  Firms",  Quarterly  Journal  of
Economics, 109, 309-340.
Greenwald  B.C.,  Stiglitz  J.E.  (1988),  "Imperfect  Information,  Finance
Constraints  and  Business  Fluctuations",  in  Kohn,  M.,  Tsiang  S.C.
(eds.),  Finance  Constraints,  Expectations,  and  Macroeconomics,
Oxford, Claredon Press, 103-140.
Greenwald B.C., Stiglitz J.E. (1993), "Financial Market Imperfections and
Business Cycles", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 77-113.
Johansen  S.  (1996),  "Likelihood  Based  Inference  in  Cointegrated  Vector
Auto-Regressive Models", Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Johansen  S.,  Juselius  K.  (2003),  "Controlling  Inflation  in  a  Cointegrated
Vector  Autoregressive  Model  with  an  Application  to  US  Data",
Department  of  Applied  Mathematics  and  Statistics  and  Economics
Department, University of Copenhagen.
Passamani G., Tamborini R. (2005), "Why does money matter? A structural
analysis  of  monetary  policy,  credit  and  aggregate  supply  effects  in
Italy"  Discussion  Paper,  Dipartimento  di  Economia,  Università  di
Trento, Trento, n.11.
Ravenna  F.,  Walsh  C.E.  (2003),  “The  Cost  Channel  in  a  New  Keynesian
Model: Evidende and Implications”, mimeo.
Taylor  J.B.  (1998),  Inflation,  Unemployment  and  Monetary  Policy,
Cambridge (Mass), MIT Press.
Trautwein  H.M.  (2000),  "The  Credit  View,  Old  and  New",  Journal  of
Economic Surveys, 14, pp.155-136.
Vickers D. (1981), "The Money Capital 'Factor'", Journal of Post-Keynesian
Economics, 4, pp.260-65.
Visco, I. (1995), "Inflation, Inflation Targeting and Monetary Policy: Notes
for Discussion on the Italian Experience" in Leiderman, L. and L.E.O.
Svensson, eds., Inflation Targets, London, CEPR.20
Figure  1.  Italy,  plots  of  variables  (left  to  right):  inflation  rate1;  index  of
industrial real wages1; index of industrial production (12 months ahead)1;
inter-bank  rate2;  credit  risk  premium;  German  inter-bank  rate1;  Average


























Sources: 1IMF, International Financial Statistics; 2Bank of Italy, Monetary
Statistics21
Figure 2. Germany, plots of variables (left to right): inflation rate1; index of
industrial  real  wages2,1;  index  of  industrial  production  (12  months























Sources:  1OECD,  Statistical  Compendium;  2IFS,  International  Financial
Statistics; 3Bundesbank; 4Economagic.com.22
Figure 3. Italy: representation of the inter-bank rate (solid line) and the
derived intervention (dotted line) to make inflation stationary around 2%.







Figure 4. Italy: observed (solid line) and "new" inflation (dotted line)









Figure 5. Italy: observed (solid line) and "new" output (dotted line)


































Figure 7. Germany: representation of the inter-bank rate (solid line) and the
derived intervention (dotted line) to make inflation stationary around 2%.








Figure 8. Germany: observed (solid line) and "new" inflation (dotted line)








Figure 9. Germany: observed (solid line)  and "new" output (dotted line)



































A1. The unrestricted cointegrated model
Given the p-dimensional (p = 5) observed process y't = [wt, kt, rt, qt+12,
pt+12]  and  the  unrestricted  vector  autoregressive  model  written  in  error
correction  form  (VECM),  the  LR  trace  test  suggested  an  eigenvector
decomposition of the long-run matrix P P P P into r = 3 stationary directions, the
cointegration vectors, and (p - r) = 2 nonstationary directions. With r = 3 the
modulus of the largest stationary root in the model is 0.87 for Italy and 0.81
for Germany.
The  singular  matrix  P P P P,  of  rank  r,  has  the  representation  P P P P  =  a a a ab b b b’,
where a a a a and b b b b are matrices of full rank r. The columns of b b b b correspond to
the  r  cointegrating  relations,  which  represent  the  long-run  relationships
that can be detected among the variables xt ("attractor set"), whereas the
elements in the columns of a a a a are the adjustment coefficients of endogenous
variables towards the long-run relationships. Associated with the (p - r) = 2
nonstationary relations is a matrix,  ^ a a a a , orthogonal to  a a a a, whose elements
measure the extent to which cumulated stochastic shocks push the variables
along their long-run relationships.
Table A.1 for Italy and Table A.2 for Germany report the eigenvector
decomposition of  P P P P into  the  r  cointegrating  relations,  together  with  their
adjustment coefficients. Using the information given by the covariances of
the  data  and  the  finding  of  3  cointegrating  relations,  the  unrestricted
relations were normalized with respect to the 3 variables that the theory
indicates as "endogenous" (pt+12, wt, qt+12) vis-à-vis the CCC “explanatory”
variables (kt, rt, k*t) and the trend for Italy and (kt, rt, Libt) and the trend
for Germany.
Table A.1. Italy: the stationary components of yt (bold  a coefficients denote
significance at 5%)
12 + pt wt 12 + t q t k t r k*t trendt
The cointegrating matrix β ˆ  (transposed)
' ˆ
1 β 1.000 0.172 -0.218 -0.023 0.197 -0.543 0.000
' ˆ
2 β -1.191 1.000 1.743 -4.474 1.925 2.281 -0.006
' ˆ
3 β -0.299 0.917 1.000 1.708 0.507 -0.944 -0.0022
The adjustment coefficient matrix α ˆ  (transposed)
' ˆ 1 α -0.011 -0.326 0.987 0.011 -0.231
' ˆ 2 α 0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.008 -0.016
' ˆ 3 α 0.009 -0.051 -0.169 -0.033 -0.005
Table  A.2.  Germany:  the  stationary  components  of  yt  (bold  a  coefficients
denote significance at 5%)
12 + pt wt 12 + t q t k t r Lib*t trendt
The cointegrating matrix β ˆ  (transposed)
' ˆ
1 β 1.000 -0.371 -0.062 0.191 0.899 -0.097 0.001
' ˆ
2 β 0.647 1.000 0.350 2.817 1.614 1.992 -0.002
' ˆ
3 β -1.687 -1.053 1.000 5.173 7.830 -0.985 0.002
The adjustment coefficient matrix α ˆ  (transposed)
' ˆ 1 α -0.112 0.416 0.037 0.026 -0.077
' ˆ 2 α -0.061 -0.338 0.135 -0.017 0.009
' ˆ 3 α 0.000 0.021 -0.097 -0.004 -0.017
As regards the adjustment coefficients matrices α ˆ , since  a zero row of
a a a a is the condition for the  corresponding  variable to  be weakly  exogenous
w.r.t.  the  cointegration  relations,  interbank  rate  for  Italy  as  well  as
interbank rate and risk for Germany can be safely taken as exogenous, as
required by the theoretical model20.
                                           
20  The  relevant  hypotheses  to  test  takes  the  form  0 α R = a ' : ) r (   Hc ,  where  the
matrix  R  becomes the following row vector: [ ] 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 '   = R  if we want to test the
weak  exogeneity  hypothesis  of  kt,  [ ] 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 '   = R   if  we  want  to  test  the  weak
exogeneity hypothesis of rt. The LR test statistic, distributed as a  2
3 c , is equal to
2.316, with a p-value=0.510 for kt in the Italian data set and is equal 3.600 wit a p-
value=0.308 for kt in the German data set; the same statistic is equal to 2.604, with
a p-value=0.457 for rt in the German data set. According to Garratt et al. (2003),
weakly exogenous variables can be considered to be as “long-run forcing” variables,
and, on this assumption, the cointegrating properties of the model can be analysed
without having to specify their relative equations.3
A2. The control problem
As in Johansen and Juselius (2003), we define as target variables the
nonstationary  variables  t x b'   that  we  would  like  to  control  so  that  they
become stationary with mean b*. To this end, we use a control rule and the
instruments  t x a' , where a and b are (pxm) matrices, with m corresponding
to the number of target variables and of instruments.
The  necessary  condition  for  controllability  is  that  0 Ca b' ¹ ,  where
^
-
^ ^ ^ = ' ) ' ( C a a a a b b b b G G G G a a a a b b b b 1 ,  with  ^ a a a a and  ^ b b b b   (p´(p-r))  matrices  orthogonal  to  a a a a








i G G G G G G G G I . Under this condition it is possible to
define a recursive control rule (Johansen and Juselius, 2003, p.19), which
takes the following form for our model :
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The next value for the process will therefore be the following:
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We  have  used  the  estimated  parameters  and  the  residuals  of  the  VECM
model to generate  ctr
t y ,  new
t y  and the intervention  t v  of Section 3.4. ￿
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￿￿￿!￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿













￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1￿￿￿ %￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ .￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ %￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ /￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ /￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ !￿￿￿￿￿






















￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ !￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿=￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
0*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1￿￿
￿









































￿￿￿ ￿*￿ 2￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿ +￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ +￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ?,￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿@￿ 1￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿￿
1￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿7￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿￿ ￿9￿ 1￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿>￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿44￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿













.>￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ &￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ %￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿


















￿￿￿&￿’￿ *￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ !￿￿)￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ;￿￿￿￿￿￿ %￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<
%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿&￿*￿2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿






￿￿￿&￿:￿ 3￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ &#*￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿
￿
￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿ %￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿




￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ /￿￿￿￿￿￿ $￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ "￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿






￿￿￿&￿￿ ￿ 1￿￿￿ /￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ .￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ *￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿￿0￿
.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿￿&￿￿&￿ !￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿ ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ !￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿7￿￿)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿




1￿)￿￿ 3￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ .￿￿4￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ %￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿






















￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿￿￿ -￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ #-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿












￿￿￿’￿:￿ !￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ 4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5"￿ /￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
&￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
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￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿